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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
On November 4, 2014, the Judicial Selection Amendment 
(Amendment II) to the Tennessee Constitution came before the state’s 
electorate. Amendment II sought to replace the role played by the Judicial 
Nominating Commission by expanding the governor’s appellate judiciary 
appointment power while simultaneously clarifying and codifying what is 
known as the Tennessee Plan for judicial selection. Although some felt that 
this amendment went directly against the measured determinations of the 
state constitution’s drafters, Amendment II passed by a relatively wide 
margin, thereby altering and solidifying the judicial selection process in the 
State of Tennessee. While the voters of Tennessee expressed resounding 
approval for the Tennessee Plan as altered by Amendment II, some 
fundamental questions still remain pertaining to its potential democratic and 
political effects on the impartial administration of justice in the state. A 
consideration of the history of Tennessee’s judicial selection process will 
bring these fundamental questions into focus and provide a baseline for 
analysis of Amendment II’s future impact.  
 
II.  JUDICIAL ELECTION AND APPOINTMENT PRIOR TO AMENDMENT II 
 
Prior to the recent passage of Constitutional Amendment No. 2 for 
the November 4, 2014, General Election Ballot (Amendment II), Article VI, 
section III of the Tennessee Constitution stated that “[t]he judges of the 
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Supreme Court shall be elected by the qualified voters of the state.”1 This 
provision stood in contrast to its sister provision in the United States 
Constitution which provides that “[the President] shall have Power, by and 
with the advice and Consent of the Senate, to . . . appoint . . . Judges of the 
Supreme Court . . . .”2 This distinction is not a novel one. Thirty-eight states 
have some form of election—be it partisan, nonpartisan, or retention—for 
the judges on their high courts.3 Similarly, of the thirty-nine states that have 
intermediate appellate courts, thirty-one of them have some form of 
election for the judges sitting on those courts.4  
Though Tennessee’s form of judicial election was not abnormal 
among the states, many felt that a change was necessary. To that effect, the 
Tennessee Plan was passed in 1971 with the purpose of minimizing the 
effects of partisan politics on the judiciary while still satisfying the electoral 
mandate of the Constitution.5 Under this plan, the Judicial Nominating 
Commission (or its predecessor), selected by the governor, nominated the 
judges of the intermediate appellate courts in Tennessee and then put them 
up for retention elections before the people of their jurisdiction.6 In 1994, 
the Tennessee Plan was expanded to include the justices of the Tennessee 
Supreme Court as well.7 The Tennessee Plan governed how the judges of 
the Tennessee appellate courts were selected for the last two decades. The 
purpose behind this judicial selection process was to assist the governor and 
the electorate in selecting qualified judges for the State of Tennessee, while 
at the same time reducing outside influences, and making the bench less 
political.8 The Judicial Nominating Commission and its predecessor have 
been a main catalyst in affecting this purpose since 1994. 	  
 The make-up of the Judicial Nominating Commission 
(Commission) was prescribed by statute.9 There were seventeen members 
of the Commission: eight appointed by the Speaker of the Senate, eight 
appointed by the Speaker of the House, and one member appointed jointly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* William H. Neal, III and Jarrod B. Casteel are second-year law students at the University 
of Tennessee College of Law with expected graduation dates in May of 2016. The 
authors would like to thank their families and, most importantly, their wives for their 
continued support and patience throughout this process. 
1 TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (revised Nov. 4, 2014). 
2 U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2. 
3 Fact Sheet on Judicial Selection Methods in the States, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/fact_sheet.authcheckd
am.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). 
4 Id.  
5 The Tennessee Plan: Keeping the Influence of Politics and Money Out of Our Courts, 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, http://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/tennplan 
brochure.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-101 (2014). 
9 TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-102 (2014). 




between the two.10 In each pool of eight commission members, there were 
to be two from each grand division of the state (East, Middle, and West 
Tennessee), followed by two at-large appointees.11 Further, at least five of 
the eight appointees from each speaker had to be lawyers, while the jointly 
appointed member could not be an attorney.12 Lastly, no more than three of 
the four at-large appointees could be from the same grand division.13	  The 
selection of members was to be done with an eye toward racial, gender, and 
geographic diversity, and any citizen that met the requirements prescribed 
in Tennessee Code Annotated section 17-4-10314 could apply for 
membership via an application on a statute-mandated website developed 
and maintained by the Administrative Office of the Courts.15  
 When a vacancy on an intermediate appellate court or the Supreme 
Court arose, the Commission would convene as early as possible and hold a 
public meeting.16 Any citizen was welcome to attend and give their 
thoughts on suggested nominations to fill the relevant judicial vacancy, and 
attorneys could voice their opinions on their own nominations.17 Following 
the hearing, the Commission was to publicly interview and vet any potential 
candidates, and all interviews and meetings were to be made public.18 
Within sixty days of the vacancy, the Commission would vote on nominees, 
name three candidates to fill the position, and submit its list to the 
governor.19 Once the governor received this list, he was to make his 
selection to fill the judicial vacancy.20 If he was not satisfied with the three 
nominees, he could request another panel of three possible judges.21 Within 
sixty days of receiving that second list of nominees, the governor was to 
make his selection to the bench from the six possible choices.22 The term of 
judges appointed in this manner expired on the thirty-first of August after 
the next regular August election.23 Once that term was up, the judge or 





14 Any member of the judicial nominating commission must be a citizen of the United States, 
must be at least 30 years of age, and must have been a citizen of the State of Tennessee 
for at least five years. Further, anyone appointed from a specific grand division must 
have been a resident of that grand division for at least one year immediately prior to 
appointment. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-103 (2014). 
15 S.B. 1573, 106th Leg., 1st Sess. (Tenn. 2009). 
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justice was to file his or her intention to run for re-election, and was then 
subject to a retention vote in his or her relevant jurisdiction.24  
After nearly a decade of this appointment system and significant 
debate on the topic, the legislature decided to let the Commission expire in 
May of 2013.25 Consequently, the expiration of the Commission 
necessitated a change in the system, prompting Senate Joint Resolution No. 
2 from the Tennessee General Assembly.26 This Resolution became known 
as Amendment II, vesting the executive with appointment power and 
ultimately removing from Article VI, section 3 the express requirement that 
the people should elect the Supreme Court justices.27 Many already felt that 
the Tennessee Plan directly conflicted with this language and opposed 
Amendment II on the grounds that it would permanently reduce the role of 
the electorate in the judicial selection process and centralize that power in 
the hands of the governor.28 Opponents felt that the language of Article VI, 
section III was plain, and that requiring Supreme Court justices to be 
elected was a measured decision made by the state’s founders.29 While 
these dissenters felt that the judicial selection process needed change, they 
believed that the new process should match the Constitution, not the other 
way around.30 
 
III.  EXPLANATION OF AMENDMENT II 
 
 Amendment II, born of the language of Senate Joint Resolution No. 
2, states that Article VI, section III of the Tennessee Constitution should be 
amended by deleting its first two sentences and replacing them with the 
following: 
 
Judges of the Supreme Court or any intermediate appellate 
court shall be appointed for a full term or to fill a vacancy 
by and at the discretion of the governor; shall be confirmed 
by the Legislature; and thereafter, shall be elected in a 
retention election by the qualified voters of the state. 
Confirmation by default occurs if the Legislature fails to 
reject an appointee within sixty calendar days of either the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-115 (2014). 
25 Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Sunsetting the Tennessee Judicial Nominating Commission: What 
Now?, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY (June 26, 2013), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/ 
detail/sunsetting-the-tennessee-judicial-nominating-commission-what-now. 
26 S.J. Res. 2, 107th Leg., 2d Sess. (Tenn. 2012). 
27 Ciara Matthews, Adding a Layer of Accountability to Judicial Appointments in Tennessee, 




29 Id.  
30 Id.  




date of appointment, if made during the annual legislative 
session, or the convening date of the next annual legislative 
session, if made out of session. The Legislature is 
authorized to prescribe such provisions as may be necessary 
to carry out Sections two and three of this article.31  
 
The language of Amendment II seems to bring Tennessee’s appointment 
regime in line with the federal system by placing the appointment power 
squarely in the governor’s hands, as opposed to the Commission.32  
 On November 4, 2014, over one-third of Tennessee’s registered 
voters cast their votes in favor of Amendment II.33 While this amendment 
has effectively changed the constitutional judicial election language, there 
is still a question as to whether these changes will have any practical impact 
on the democratic judicial electoral process in Tennessee. Without 
understanding the potential effects that this amendment may have on the 
democratic process, executive power, and judicial decision-making, it is 
impossible to determine whether its passage is actually a net benefit to the 
people of the state. 
 
IV.  POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF AMENDMENT II 
 
1. Effect on Tennessee’s democratic process 
 
 In the United States, state and federal judicial selection processes 
are somewhat different. These differences have typically arisen in response 
to the electorate’s desire to be consulted on the appointment of judges to the 
state’s appellate courts. In light of this understood electoral directive, one 
should ask whether Amendment II supports this movement, or whether its 
implementation will take the appointment of appellate judges a step further 
away from the desires of the public. One should also consider whether this 
potential change is beneficial to democracy as a whole.  
 Amendment II’s passage has consolidated the pre-1994 judicial 
electoral process and the post-1994 statutory appointment process into a 
constitutional judicial selection procedure led by the governor.34 Proponents 
of Amendment II claimed that this change would move the appointment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 S.J. Res. 2, 107th Leg., 2d Sess. (Tenn. 2012). 
32 Id.  
33 Tennessee Judicial Selection, Amendment 2 (2014), BALLOTPEDIA.ORG, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Tennessee_Judicial_Selection,_Amendment_2_%282014%29 (last 
visited Dec. 18, 2014).   
34 See generally TENN. CONST. art. 6, § 3; TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-102; S.J. Res. 2, 107th 
Leg., 2d Sess. (Tenn. 2012). 
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process back toward the voters.35 Voters were told that Amendment II 
would protect their democratic rights because: (1) they are able to vote for 
the governor who would then make appointments; (2) they vote for their 
state senators and state representatives who hold the power of confirmation; 
and (3) the electorate gets the opportunity to retain or replace their appellate 
judges and justices at the end of their respective terms.36 While these 
proposed protections are unquestionably democratic tenets, the question 
remains as to whether this amendment is actually giving the people their 
desired say in the judicial appointment process. It seems that Amendment 
II’s appointment mechanism has once and for all rescinded the direct vote 
on appellate judges, and given ultimate appointment power to the executive.  
 Superficially, it may seem as though Amendment II has quieted the 
democratic voice of the people of Tennessee. However, Amendment II’s 
appointment mechanism not only seems to be a legitimate attempt to 
protect the democratic process, but the ideals embodied within were also 
understood as democratic virtues by the framers of the United States 
Constitution. In Federalist 76, Alexander Hamilton opined that there were 
three ways to carry out a selection process. Officers, ambassadors, and 
judges could be appointed: (1) solely by the executive; (2) by a “select 
assembly of a moderate number”; or (3) by the executive with a 
concurrence from the assembly.37 Hamilton believed that the initial 
selection of judges should be exercised by a single man—the executive—
with a concurrence from the legislature.38 It was his belief that the executive 
would be subject to a concern for his reputation and sheltered from the 
large number of “personal attachments” that an assembly of men would 
have.39  
The necessity of the executive appointment regime is born out in an 
example that Hamilton describes as “the manner of appointment in [the 
State of New York].”40 This case study provides a look into his second 
option—appointment by an assembly.41 Hamilton paints a picture of a small 
group of individuals, “shut up in a private apartment, impenetrable to the 
public eye . . . .”42 In this small assembly, the governor is understood to 
have the power to appoint, but the state’s constitution left his actual duties 
pertaining to appointment ambiguous.43 As a result of this ambiguity, there 
is no ability for the people to hold the governor or the members of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Amendment 2 to the Tennessee Constitution, TENNESSEE BAR ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.tba.org/info/amendment-2-to-the-tennessee-constitution (last visited Dec. 18, 
2014). 
36 Id.  
37 THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 378 (Alexander Hamilton) (The Gideon ed., 2001).  
38 Id.  
39 Id. at 378–79. 
40 THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 378 (Alexander Hamilton) (The Gideon ed., 2001). 
41 Id.  
42 Id. at 398. 
43 Id. 




assembly accountable.44 Hamilton proposed that an appointment 
mechanism similar to that reflected in Amendment II’s provisions would 
provide the correct motivations for the governor and the assembly to make 
appointments less political and more merit-driven.45 Hamilton believed that 
appointments made by governors and confirmed by a body of the assembly, 
just as Amendment II provides, would “produce all the good, without the ill 
. . . .”46 
Finally, the founders saw the type of appointment system 
proscribed by Amendment II as a valuable check on both executive and 
legislative powers.47 The powers given to each branch in this system would 
secure a balance, curbing personal desires and preventing powerful 
influences from commanding federal appointments.48 Hamilton saw the 
assembly’s ability to restrain the president in his appointments as a 
powerful tool against tyranny.49 Similarly, the same principles apply to 
Amendment II’s provision for a legislative concurrence on judicial 
appointments by the governor.50 The restraints inherent within this system, 
as understood by the framers of the Constitution, would be equivalent on 
both the executive and the assembly, but would not negate a single 
desirable advantage of having an executive alone make the appointments.51 
Admittedly, while the provisions of Tennessee’s Amendment II are 
somewhat different than those of the United States Constitution, the 
democratic virtues seem to parallel. Amendment II may have rescinded the 
possibility for a one person, one vote system for appointing appellate court 
judges in Tennessee, but its provisions move the state closer to a tried and 
true, checks and balances approach that was ratified by America’s founders 
and continues to be accepted by the people of the United States. 
 
2. Effect on executive power 
 
While this loss to the electorate is mainly a hypothetical one—
because there has not been a direct “one person, one vote” regime for 
appellate judges for quite some time—some consideration should be given 
to whether this solidification of the appointment process is good for state 
democracy in general. There is no doubt that Amendment II represents an 
increase in the power of the executive in Tennessee. Rather than being 
limited to six candidates to fill an appellate judicial vacancy, the governor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Id.  
45 Id. at 397. 
46 Id.  
47 See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton) (The Gideon ed., 2001). 
48 Id. at 397. 
49 Id.  
50 S.J. Res. 2, 107th Leg., 2d Sess. (Tenn. 2012). 
51 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 378 (Alexander Hamilton) (The Gideon ed., 2001); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 397 (Alexander Hamilton) (The Gideon ed., 2001).  
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is now only limited by the requirements set forth in Tennessee Code 
Annotated section 17-1-101, et seq.52 This power is checked, however; 
while the governor’s selection prior to Amendment II was final, now the 
nominee must face confirmation before the state legislature.53   
This check on the governor’s power brings little solace to 
opponents of Amendment II. The plain language of Article VI, section III 
of the Tennessee Constitution made clear that the power to elect justices to 
the Supreme Court resided with the people, and some argue that any plan 
circumventing that power in favor of executive appointment directly 
contradicts the careful considerations of the constitution’s framers.54 
Opponents fear that judicial appointment will lead to a lack of transparency, 
which would be wholly avoided if the people of Tennessee were allowed to 
exercise the constitutional right to elect their appellate judges.55 
The question still remains as to whether Amendment II makes 
judicial selection in the state of Tennessee more or less political. Though 
many supporters of Amendment II proclaimed that it would put an end to 
the influence of outside money and partisan politics in the judiciary, this 
assertion is based on a faulty comparison to a previous system. While 
Amendment II would certainly achieve that goal as compared to a “one 
person, one vote” regime, that system has not been used in Tennessee for 
decades.56 After Amendment II, the filling of judicial vacancies is solely in 
the hands of elected officials from appointment through confirmation, but 
judges selected to fill those vacancies will still be subject to retention votes 
at the end of their respective terms. There is little doubt that these elections 
will remain volatile and partisan attacks will persist when a controversial 
judge is faced with retention. 
Despite the potential misconception that Amendment II will curb 
the impact of outside political pressures on Tennessee’s judiciary, it does 
reduce partisanship and encourage cooperation. The absence of direct 
elections as called for by Article VI, Section III of the Tennessee 
Constitution in effect eliminates the adverse nature of the judicial selection 
process. Further, judges being appointed and confirmed by directly elected 
officials, rather than nominated by a commission, increases accountability 
leading to greater cooperation and efficiency.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Supreme court justices are required to be at least 35 years of age and judges of other 
courts must be at least 30 years of age. TENN. CODE ANN.  § 17-1-101.  
53 S.J. Res. 2, 107th Leg., 2d Sess. (Tenn. 2012). 
54 Ciara Matthews, Adding a Layer of Accountability to Judicial Appointments in Tennessee, 
NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Oct. 9, 2014, 11:17 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/ 
unnaturally-political/389943/adding-layer-accountability-judicial-appointments 
tennessee-ciara. 
55 Vote No on Amendment 2, Sends Message of Accountability, THE TENNESSEAN (Oct. 16, 
2014, 4:02 PM), http://www.tennessean.com/story/opinion/editorials/2014/10/15/ 
amendment-tennessee-voting/17317859/. 
56 Id.  




Under Amendment II, all officials involved in the judicial selection 
process are answerable to the people. In order to make a suitable selection, 
the governor must investigate and vet the candidates on his own, or he will 
no doubt be subject to scrutiny and questioning by the electorate. Likewise, 
the state legislature must tread carefully to make sure that the governor’s 
nominee is the right candidate for the job and can competently serve the 
state in his or her judicial capacity. Finally, the newly appointed judge or 
justice will be answerable to the electorate during his or her inevitable 
retention election, where the people of Tennessee can voice their pleasure 
or displeasure with the individual.57 Proponents of Amendment II believe 
that this accountability and lack of an adversarial election process provides 
constitutional clarity and an unhindered judiciary, while opponents feel that 
direct elections strike a better balance between accountability, transparency, 
and democratic principles.58 
Ultimately, it can be said that Amendment II increases 
accountability in the way that our appellate judges are appointed. Moreover, 
while the amendment undoubtedly expands executive power, that power is 
checked by the legislature, and both are answerable to the state’s electorate 
for their decisions.59 These checks, however, do not assuage the argument 
that the direct election of Tennessee’s judges was a measured right given to 
the people, and taking it away confounds the separation of powers in a way 
that the Constitution’s framers may have thought improper.60  
 
V.  EFFECT ON JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING  
 
One of the worst potential pitfalls of any judicial selection process 
is that it could chill judicial autonomy by compelling judges to consider 
their job security when writing opinions. Society needs judges to make fair, 
impartial, and legally correct rulings from the bench. The specter of 
adversarial campaign politics coloring judicial decisions is a danger that 
many in Tennessee see as a threat to impartiality.61 The Tennessee Plan was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 S.J. Res. 2, 107th Leg., 2d Sess. (Tenn. 2012). 
58 Vote No on Amendment 2, Sends Message of Accountability, THE TENNESSEAN (Oct. 16, 
2014, 4:02 PM), http://www.tennessean.com/story/opinion/editorials/2014/10/15/ 
amendment-tennessee-voting/17317859/; Phil Bredesen & Fred Thompson, Vote Yes on 
2 is Best Path for Judicial Selection, THE TENNESSEAN (Apr. 29, 2014, 3:31 AM), 
http://www.tennessean.com/story/opinion/contributors/2014/04/29/vote-yes-best-path-
judicial-selection/8427555/. 
59 S.J. Res. 2, 107th Leg., 2d Sess. (Tenn. 2012). 
60 Ciara Matthews, Adding a Layer of Accountability to Judicial Appointments in Tennessee, 
NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Oct. 9, 2014, 11:17 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/ 
unnaturally-political/389943/adding-layer-accountability-judicial-appointments-
tennessee-ciara. 
61 The Tennessee Plan, Keeping the Influence of Politics and Money Out of Our Courts, 
http://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/tennplanbrochure.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). 
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introduced to alleviate that threat and its ideals continue to be popular with 
the electorate, as evidenced by the recent passage of Amendment II.62  
The potential of election ambitions effecting judicial opinions is 
alarming and brings to mind the worst types of political corruption and 
deprivations of rights by a greedy political class. Opponents of Amendment 
II, however, argue that this new judicial selection process will lead to an 
increase in back door bargaining, secret political favors, and an opaque 
process that threatens judicial independence, all the while removing a 
constitutional right explicitly granted to the electorate.63 It is yet to be seen 
whether the potential desire for executive favor will be any more or less of 
an issue than the vices associated with direct election, but the passage of 
Amendment II makes clear that the people of Tennessee trust all three 
branches of their government to work together and effectuate the impartial 
administration of justice.64 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
 While the people of Tennessee have been explicitly deprived of 
their right to directly elect their appellate judges, the new, merit based 
approach of Amendment II provides an efficient system with its own high 
level of accountability. Further, the amendment will likely reduce political 
influences in the judiciary by embracing the familiar checks and balances of 
the federal appointment system.  Overall, the passage of Amendment II will 
likely be considered a net gain for representative democracy, but it is clear 
that its enactment has left several fundamental questions unanswered.  
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